Supreme Court Decisions in 2011 and 2012 Quiz

Answer: yes

All nine of the Justices agreed in the result, which was that the government exceeded its authority in placing the GPS device on the defendant's car, without a valid warrant and without consent of the car's owner. However, Justices Scalia and Alito differed sharply on the proper reasoning used to arrive at this conclusion. The majority opinion, authored by Scalia, based its conclusion on a common law trespass theory, while Alito's concurrence used a model looking at the citizen's "reasonable expectation of privacy" being invaded.

The difference here is that in this modern electronic age, there are many ways to conduct searches without engaging in any physical trespass whatsoever upon a citizen's property. Thus, the more forward-looking concept is the "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach. Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she said that both approaches were valid, and the government must obtain a warrant if it proposes to invade either a citizen's physical space *or* a citizen's privacy.

Answer: The Supremacy Clause

Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that the Arizona Law (SB 1040) did in fact violate the Supremacy Clause, under which the federal government has the sole responsibility of determining immigration rights and procedures. Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the Arizona law did *not* violate the Supremacy Clause, since it did not exclude immigrants whom federal law would admit, or admit those whom federal law would exclude.

This was a 5-3 decision, since newly-appointed Justice Elena Kagan did not participate, due to her prior involvement with the case as part of the Executive branch.

Answer: no

In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the majority concluded that the act did in fact violate free speech. A strong dissent by Justice Alito, joined by Scalia and Thomas, argued that the Act was constitutional, and cited findings Congress had made in concluding that the Act was necessary to protect the integrity of the Medal of Honor and other military awards. One of those findings was that in a single year, more than 600 Virginia residents had falsely claimed to have won the Medal of Honor!

Answer: Void for vagueness

All eight justices participating in the decision ruled that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rule in question did not put broadcasters on sufficient notice as to what was proper and what was not proper. Hence, the rule was impermissibly vague and could not be enforced.

Answer: Elena Kagan

Justice Kagan crafted such a well-reasoned opinion that all the other eight justices joined in. Kagan wrote that the rule under which deportation for Mr. Judulang was sought was "unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. It allows an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance-whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country may stay here." The government had sought to use the statutory grounds for keeping an alien out of the country as a basis for deporting someone already in the country, an approach which the court felt was arbitrary and capricious and could not be upheld.

President Obama appointed Elena Kagan in 2010 and Sonia Sotomayor in 2009. These two Obama appointees joined a court which also consisted of two George W. Bush appointees (Alito and Roberts), two Clinton appointees (Breyer and Ginsburg), one George H. W. Bush appointee (Thomas), and two Reagan appointees (Scalia and Kennedy).

Answer: Eighth Amendment

The decision was a logical outgrowth of the court's two prior Eighth Amendment decisions involving juvenile offenders. In Roper v. Simmons the court had held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for children. Then in Graham v. Florida, the court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense.

In Miller v. Alabama, the court extended the Graham reasoning, stating that the same rationale that applies to nonhomicide offenses should also apply to homicide offenses. That rationale is that "children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. Their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking."

The four conservative court members dissented, these four being Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. Their dissent argued that the sentence of life without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders could not be considered "unusual", since at the time of the decision there were 2,500 or so offenders serving such sentences in the U.S. As far as whether such a sentence could be considered "cruel", the dissent pointed to the "evolving standards of decency" test used in past cases, and said that the trend since the 1980's has been away from rehabilitation and toward more punitive measures. Thus, such sentences can be considered neither cruel nor unusual, and so do not violate the Eighth Amendment.

The point to be understood here is that life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile homicide offender is permissible in an individual case, it is just not permissible when based on a law that *requires* the judge to mete out this punishment based on the crime. In the case before the court, a 14-year-old boy had been along with some older friends who decided to rob a video store. When the store clerk was killed in the robbery, the 14-year-old was charged with first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.

Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, wrote that when the defendant is re-sentenced, the sentencing court should determine whether the defendant "killed or intended to kill" the robbery victim. If not, as appeared to be the case, then he can be said to have a "twice diminished moral culpability"; once by virtue of his youth, and secondly by virtue of his lack of any intent to kill. In this type of situation, Justice Breyer felt that life without the possibility of parole can never be a constitutional sentence.

Answer: The act was permissible under the power of Congress to tax.

Leading up to the decision, all the commentary centered around whether Congress could actually mandate citizens to participate in commerce, as opposed to regulating existing commerce, under the Commerce Clause of the constitution. The court agreed that Congress had no such power. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Framers "gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be sustained under Congress's power to 'regulate Commerce'."

In a real oddity, Justice Roberts' opinion is considered the law of the case, even though no other justice completely agreed with his reasoning! The four other justices who joined in his opinion (usually called the "liberal" wing of the court), felt that Congress did in fact have the authority to enact the individual mandate. The four dissenters felt the act in question was unconstitutional, exceeding the lawful powers of Congress. The court's usual swing vote, Justice Kennedy, here voted with the "conservatives", while Chief Justice Roberts took the place of Kennedy as the swing vote, giving the "liberals" the fifth vote for upholding the act.

However, Justice Roberts surprised everyone by coming up with another theory to uphold the act. He stated that the mandated payment is really more like a tax, and could be upheld as such. His reasoning was that "the payment is not so high that there is really no choice but to buy health insurance; the payment is not limited to willful violations, as penalties for unlawful acts often are; and the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation."

Answer: The failure to share exculpatory evidence with the defense

Under the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, decided by the court in 1963, prosecutors have an affirmative duty to turn over to the defense any evidence with might be considered to be exculpatory. The idea here is that the prosecutor's oath is to do justice, not merely to convict.

In Smith v. Cain, the defendant was convicted solely on the eyewitness testimony of a single witness, with absolutely no physical evidence to support the defendant's guilt. The prosecutor failed to reveal to the defense that initial interviews with the witness revealed he could not describe the intruders and could not see their faces. Such information could have been used to attack the witness's credibility on cross-examination.

Thi8s case was a part of a pattern of corruption of the particular District Attorney's office, involved, with as many as 28 convictions being tainted by similar Brady violations.

Answer: yes

The case was Snyder v. Phelps, decided on March 2, 2011. The syllabus of the court summarized the court's reasoning quite well: "Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials.

It did not disrupt Mathew Snyder's funeral, and its choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. Because this Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled, Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this case."

Answer: Mandatory strip searches of anyone under arrest are legal

Here Justice Kennedy sided with the four conservatives to uphold the mandatory search laws in effect in many states. The four liberals dissented, feeling that such searches can only be justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that weapons or drugs are present.

The case involved a man picked up because it was mistakenly thought there was a warrant for his arrest for an unpaid traffic fine. In fact, he had already paid the fine, so this was about as sympathetic a case for the defendant as could be imagined. Nevertheless, the court ruled that his strip search was permissible.