Russia's Great Patriotic War 1941-42: Axis Advance Quiz

Answer: Red Army launched an assault in Crimea to retake a key port of Sevastopol

The unsuccessful Soviet Kerch-Feodosia amphibious operation aimed at liberating Crimea was launched only in the end of 1941 thus it has no connection with the summer battles of 1941.

Answer: In the Southern sector

Germans had much less initial success in the South. The Soviet South-western Front commander, Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos, a talented and energetic commander, had kept in close contact with the border guards in the days prior to the invasion, moving his forces smoothly through the various stages of alert. Because of the prewar Soviet belief that any German attack would focus on Ukraine, Kirponos was blessed with a relative wealth of mechanized formations to counter First Panzer Group.

His forces counter-attacked the Germans during the Battle of Brody which was the largest tank battle in history at the time.

Although the attack was unsuccessful, it inflicted heavy losses on the Germans and significantly slowed down their advance. Despite losing much of its mechanized corps during the Battle of Uman, Soviet South-Western Front continued to remain a formidable fighting force. Only when the forces of German Army Group Centre joined the battle, was the Soviet South-Western Front encircled and destroyed in September 1941.

The commander of South-western Front, Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos was killed during an attempt to lead his troops out of the encirclement.

Answer: Red Army's anti-tank gun emplacements were grouped together, allowing the German Panzer forces to easily bypass defensive strongpoints

In 1941, Red Army's anti-tank guns were distributed evenly along the front. This was a serious drawback as it allowed German Panzer forces to focus their offensive might on a very small sector of the front against weak Soviet defenses, overwhelm them by numbers and then turn right and left to bypass and outflank other Soviet defenses. The Soviets learned from their mistakes and later on they would group their anti-tank guns together which would cover all areas.

The distance between neighboring strongpoints was less than kilometer. If German tanks tried to pass between two strongpoints, they would expose their weaker side armor to the Soviet anti-tank guns.

These Soviet tactics were effectively used against the Germans during the decisive 1943 Battle of Kursk.

Answer: The destruction of 4 Soviet Armies in the Vyazma pocket during the initial German advance on Moscow is comparable in terms of losses to Kiev disaster

The encirclement and destruction of four Soviet Armies in the pockets around Vyazma and Bryansk during the initial German advance on Moscow, codenamed Operation Typhoon, in October 1941, led to almost 1 million Red Army casualties of whom approximately 380,000 were killed and wounded while 600,000 soldiers became PoW's, many of whom would never return from the German death camps.

As a result of this catastrophe, the road to Moscow was practically open. To slow down the German advance, Soviet command send every available conscript as well cadets to the front, many of whom were poorly equipped and lacked experience, but later sufficient reserves would be gathered to restore the front.

Answer: None. All of these Soviet offensive operations failed

Eager to accomplish the objectives that the Soviets failed to reach during the winter of 1941-1942, Stalin preferred that the Red Army resume its general offensive in the spring- summer 1942. Even though Stalin finally agreed to conduct a deliberate strategic defense along the Moscow axis, he insisted that the Red Army conduct offensive operations in other sectors at least to weaken the German blow toward Moscow and perhaps to regain the strategic initiative as well. Consequently, Stalin ordered his forces to mount offensives on multiple axis in the North, Centre and South. Predictably, after achieving initial limited gains, all of these Soviet offensives failed with terrible losses. Reasons for Soviet failures were Soviet overestimation of their own capabilities after achieving victory in the Battle of Moscow as well as underestimation of the German forces, which Stalin believed were already at their limit.

Answer: Romania

Ever since Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, Romania consistently contributed the largest amount of troops to the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. At its peak, during the 1942 German spring counterstroke at Kharkov, summer advances in Crimea and Southern Russia, Romania contributed as many as 600,000 troops to the German war effort.

This number exceeds that of all other Axis allies (Hungary, Italy, Finland, volunteers from Europe) combined. During the Battle of Stalingrad, both flanks of the German 6th Army were defended by Romanian 3rd Army in the North and Romanian 4th Army in the South, comprising a total amount of over 225 000 troops.

It was against these two armies, that the decisive Soviet counter-offensive codenamed Operation Uranus, would begin.

After suffering near complete destruction at Stalingrad with losses estimated at 158,850, Romanian war in the east was effectively put to an end. From that point on, Romania participated only in defensive battles against the Red Army in Ukraine, Crimea and Romania itself.

Answer: All of these factors played a part in the early successes of German advance during Fall Blau

As was the case with Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941, Fall Blau was initially a major German success. However, just as in 1941, as the advance continued, German tactical successes did not add up to decisive strategic victory, and each new advance led nowhere.

Answer: Soviets launched a counter-offensive in the Caucasus against the advancing German army

During the German summer advances of 1942 the Soviets never launched a major counter-offensive in the Caucasus that would affect the Germans in any way. In August, when Army Group A captured the small Maikop oil field in the Caucasus, it discovered that defenders had systematically destroyed all the oil wells and refineries in the area. On 28th of August, the Red Army's Transcaucasus Front finally halted the leading elements of Army Group A along the crests of the Caucasus.

A strong set of field fortifications and local air superiority allowed the Red Army to prevent the Germans from capturing the large Grozny oil fields. Despite the propaganda value when a few German mountain troops planted their flag on the highest point in the Caucasus Mountains, Mount Elbrus, the southern thrust was virtually exhausted by mid-September.

As all remaining German resources, including most of Luftwaffe, were being directed to support German 6th Army in its advance to the Volga and Stalingrad, the Caucasus front became of secondary importance.

Answer: 90 percent

The Wehrmacht eventually occupied over 90 percent of the city. Despite being on a verge of collapse for several times, the Soviet defenders showed tremendous courage, tenacity and refused to surrender, fighting for every block, house and room. A good example, among many, was the so-called "Pavlov's House".

A Russian sergeant Yakov Pavlov and his platoon of 24 men held the four-storey apartment block for 60 days. Wave after wave of German infantry and panzer assaults were repelled under intense fire.

The house remains today as a symbol of Russia's stubborn resistance. In an attempt to defeat the remaining Soviet defenders, almost all German soldiers in the area were stuck in the ruins of the city.

Answer: Approximately 11,300,000 for the Red Army and 2,850,000 for the Wehrmacht

During Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army suffered approximately 4.8 million casualties. A significant portion of these casualties were PoW's- approximately 2.7 million Red Army soldiers were captured during the German advances of 1941. The Wehrmacht suffered close to 1 million casualties (almost a third of its invading force) with over 300,000 killed, others wounded, including 10,000 prisoners who were captured during the Battle of Moscow.
During 1942, the Red Army suffered approximately 6.53 million casualties. Although this time around the Germans captured fewer Soviet PoW's than they did in 1941, the Soviet casualties rose due to the greater length of time during which the battles took place. The Wehrmacht suffered approximately 1.85 million losses with over 600 000 killed/missing and the rest wounded. The highest losses were sustained during Fall Blau, Battle of Stalingrad and battles in the Rzhev salient aka Rzhev meat-grinder.
Thanks to having a well-organized mobilization structure and more trained reservists, the unprepared Red Army and USSR managed to survive the initial might of the German onslaught. The steadily rising casualties in the protracted war in the East and German inability to achieve a quick and decisive win over the Soviets, ensured that from 1942 and onwards, the Wehrmacht would consistently fight with their forces being understrength and lacking in manpower reserves. As the war dragged on, the growing combat skills of Red Army meant that Wehrmacht was destined to suffer even more devastating losses in the future.