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Quiz about Russias Great Patriotic War 194243 Tide Turns
Quiz about Russias Great Patriotic War 194243 Tide Turns

Russia's Great Patriotic War 1942-43: Tide Turns Quiz


An in-depth quiz dedicated to the second period of the war, from November 1942 to December 1943, during which the strategic initiative shifted permanently into the Red Army's hands. Take your time to choose an answer. Enjoy and evaluate!

A multiple-choice quiz by Uspech3da. Estimated time: 10 mins.
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Author
Uspech3da
Time
10 mins
Type
Multiple Choice
Quiz #
388,147
Updated
Dec 03 21
# Qns
10
Difficulty
Very Difficult
Avg Score
4 / 10
Plays
146
- -
Question 1 of 10
1. On November 19th 1942, Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a Stalingrad counter-offensive aimed at encircling and destroying Axis forces in Southern Russia. The offensive was a major success and it trapped over 300,000 soldiers of the German 6th Army. Which of these was NOT a reason that lead to Soviet success in this operation? Hint


Question 2 of 10
2. After decisively destroying German forces around Stalingrad in early February 1943, Soviets also went on to simultaneously destroy Germany's Axis allies in Southern Russia, inflicting an unparalleled defeat on Axis forces which meant that Nazi Germany would lose the war. How many Axis armies did the Soviets managed to destroy and what were the combined Axis casualties? Hint


Question 3 of 10
3. After the decisive Soviet victory at Stalingrad, one famous Allied person wrote the following: "I want to express to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements unsurpassed in all history. The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of our people." Who wrote it? Hint


Question 4 of 10
4. In March 1943, after months of non-stop advance in Southern Russia, Soviet offensives were stopped by a series of German counterstrokes around Donets Basin and Kharkov, led by Erich Von Manstein. Which of one of these four was NOT a reason which brought to a halt Red Army's winter campaign of 1942-1943? Hint


Question 5 of 10
5. As a last ditch effort to regain strategic initiative, on July 5th 1943 Germans launched Operation Citadel, a major offensive at the Kursk bulge which turned into the greatest tank battle ever. As the plan called for double envelopment to destroy Soviet armies in the salient, Germans would strike from North and South. The Soviets would prepare three main defensive belts in each sector. In which sector of the offensive did the Panzer forces managed to achieve deepest penetration? Hint


Question 6 of 10
6. After weeks of fighting in the Kursk salient, Soviets managed to fully stop German advances in North and South by late July. In early August, Soviets launched their own counter-offensives which forced the Germans to fully retreat from both sectors and which meant that Operation Citadel failed while the Soviets irreversibly took over the strategic initiative. Which one of these was NOT a reason that lead to the failure of German offensive and subsequent Soviet advances? Hint


Question 7 of 10
7. After Kursk, one key Nazi German general said the following: "As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, because of the large losses in people and equipment, for a long time were put out of action. Needless to say, the Russians hastened to use their success. And there were no more quiet days on the Eastern Front. The initiative was completely transferred to the enemy." Who said it? Hint


Question 8 of 10
8. After the Wehrmacht defeat at Kursk, the Germans began a full-scale retreat from the left-bank Ukraine and Donets basin to the mighty Dnieper river where they hoped to contain the Soviets for a long time. What was characteristic during August-September 1943 German retreat and Soviet advance? Hint


Question 9 of 10
9. The Battle for the Dnieper, fought from September to December 1943, was the single largest operation of WW2 as well as being costly for both sides. The battle proved to be another major defeat of the Wehrmacht. Which one of these aspects was NOT a direct outcome of this major battle? Hint


Question 10 of 10
10. "The battle of Kursk... the forcing of the Dnieper... and the liberation of Kiev, left Hitlerite Germany facing catastrophe." Which famous Soviet military leader said this? Hint



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Quiz Answer Key and Fun Facts
1. On November 19th 1942, Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a Stalingrad counter-offensive aimed at encircling and destroying Axis forces in Southern Russia. The offensive was a major success and it trapped over 300,000 soldiers of the German 6th Army. Which of these was NOT a reason that lead to Soviet success in this operation?

Answer: Red Army achieved 5 to 1 numerical superiority in manpower over Axis forces in Southern Russia

Popular notion that Soviets won battles simply by overwhelming numbers is factually incorrect. While Soviet forces in Southern Russia did have a numerical advantage, the ratio was actually only 1.4 to 1 or less. The Soviets skilfully managed to obtain a bigger and favorable numerical superiority by concentrating their main mobile combat forces along critical attack axes where they pinpointed weaknesses in Axis defenses.

In Stalingrad, those weaknesses were German flanks protected by under-strength Romanian armies. Thus the main Soviet blow would come at enemy's weakest points.

Here, the Soviets achieved a 2 to 1 or even greater numerical superiority while other sectors of the front remain quiet. Thus Soviet numerical superiority was achieved by skilfully concentrating their forces at critical points rather than simply having overwhelming numbers everywhere.
2. After decisively destroying German forces around Stalingrad in early February 1943, Soviets also went on to simultaneously destroy Germany's Axis allies in Southern Russia, inflicting an unparalleled defeat on Axis forces which meant that Nazi Germany would lose the war. How many Axis armies did the Soviets managed to destroy and what were the combined Axis casualties?

Answer: 2 and a half German armies, 2 Romanian armies, 1 Italian army and 1 Hungarian army. Total- approximately 840,000 casualties

Axis casualties breakdown by country:

Germany- 6th army and 4th Panzer army destroyed while 2nd army was badly damaged. 400,000+ casualties;

Romania- 3rd and 4th army destroyed. 158,000 casualties;

Italy- 8th army destroyed. 122,000 casualties;

Hungary- 2nd army destroyed. 160,000 casualties.
3. After the decisive Soviet victory at Stalingrad, one famous Allied person wrote the following: "I want to express to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements unsurpassed in all history. The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of our people." Who wrote it?

Answer: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Roosevelt wrote this official letter to Stalin on February 23rd 1943, on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Red Army (February 23rd 1918), less than a month after great Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The remnants of German 6th army surrendered to the Red Army in Stalingrad on February 2nd 1943.
4. In March 1943, after months of non-stop advance in Southern Russia, Soviet offensives were stopped by a series of German counterstrokes around Donets Basin and Kharkov, led by Erich Von Manstein. Which of one of these four was NOT a reason which brought to a halt Red Army's winter campaign of 1942-1943?

Answer: Germans destroyed a numerically superior and full-strength Soviet rearguard troops

In March 1943 Soviet units were anything but full-strength. After months of non-stop advance, Soviet supply lines were overstretched while units severely under-strength. Soviet divisional equivalent, which was smaller than German (German division had about 12,000-15,000 troops), was usually comprised of 10,000 soldiers.

By the time they reached Kharkov and Donets basin, Soviet divisions had less than 2,000 combat effective troops. The resulting disparity between the authorized and actual sizes of many Soviet units goes a long way towards explaining the seemingly amazing performance of some German counter-attacks. If anything, the ability of a full-strength Waffen SS division to halt a Soviet "corps" or "army" resulted more from the numerical weakness of the Soviet units than from the supposed tactical superiority of the German attackers.
5. As a last ditch effort to regain strategic initiative, on July 5th 1943 Germans launched Operation Citadel, a major offensive at the Kursk bulge which turned into the greatest tank battle ever. As the plan called for double envelopment to destroy Soviet armies in the salient, Germans would strike from North and South. The Soviets would prepare three main defensive belts in each sector. In which sector of the offensive did the Panzer forces managed to achieve deepest penetration?

Answer: In the Southern sector, Belgorod direction, under the command of Erich von Manstein, Germans reached the 3rd belt of Soviet defense

In the South, Manstein's troops were larger (445,000 troops and 1,700 tanks) than their counterparts in the North (334,000 troops and 1,300 tanks). They also had more opportunities to maneuver as their forces were located on a wide and open Russian steppe whereas Northern group's movement was limited to 90km gap in the forests which the Soviets were aware of. Walter Model's forces in the North advanced only 10km and failed to go beyond the 1st Soviet defensive belt. Erich von Manstein's forces in the South advanced up to 33km and reached the 3rd and final Soviet defensive belt where they would finally be stopped by Soviet counter-attacks in the bloody Battle of Prokhorovka.
6. After weeks of fighting in the Kursk salient, Soviets managed to fully stop German advances in North and South by late July. In early August, Soviets launched their own counter-offensives which forced the Germans to fully retreat from both sectors and which meant that Operation Citadel failed while the Soviets irreversibly took over the strategic initiative. Which one of these was NOT a reason that lead to the failure of German offensive and subsequent Soviet advances?

Answer: Soviet forces in July were too strong. Had the Germans attacked in March or April, they would've won since the Soviets were under-strength at the time

A German attack in March or April would have been close to impossible. For a start, after the German defeat at Stalingrad and Manstein's counter-stroke at Kharkov in March 1943, German Panzer forces were weak, exhausted and in need of refitting. Thus Hitler needed the additional time from April to July to amass the forces and equipment necessary to guarantee a reasonable change for German success in Citadel. Secondly, Soviets moved a steady stream of powerful strategic reserves into the Kursk and Voronezh region during March-May.

These included the 21st (in March), 24th (in April), 63rd (in April), 64th (in May), 1st Tank, 27th, 53rd, and 47th Armies. Thus, a German attack in March or April would have been disastrous.
7. After Kursk, one key Nazi German general said the following: "As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, because of the large losses in people and equipment, for a long time were put out of action. Needless to say, the Russians hastened to use their success. And there were no more quiet days on the Eastern Front. The initiative was completely transferred to the enemy." Who said it?

Answer: Heinz Guderian

Guderian wrote about this in his autobiography published in 1950 called "Erinnerungen eines Soldaten" which translates as "Memoirs of a Soldier" though in English its called "Panzer Leader". At the time and just before the Battle of Kursk, Guderian was appointed as Chief Inspector of Panzer forces and carefully supervised the rebuilding of shattered Panzer forces for the unsuccessful Operation Citadel.
8. After the Wehrmacht defeat at Kursk, the Germans began a full-scale retreat from the left-bank Ukraine and Donets basin to the mighty Dnieper river where they hoped to contain the Soviets for a long time. What was characteristic during August-September 1943 German retreat and Soviet advance?

Answer: During retreat German forces implemented scorched earth policy in left-bank Ukraine and Donets basin on unprecedented scale

During 1941 retreat, Soviet scorched earth policy was the removal, destruction of industrial resources, railroads and bridges. Meanwhile Nazi German scorched earth policy, unlike Soviet, spared nothing. When Red Army began to liberate left-bank Ukraine, they found total devastation everywhere with areas largely depopulated. Every building, including residential, had been demolished. All males of working age in cities, towns and villages were deported as slave labor to Germany while all food supplies were confiscated, letting population slowly starve. Wehrmacht and Waffen SS forces also systematically burned down entire villages, poisoned water wells, stole crops.

It would take more than a decade for the region to recover from this tragedy.
9. The Battle for the Dnieper, fought from September to December 1943, was the single largest operation of WW2 as well as being costly for both sides. The battle proved to be another major defeat of the Wehrmacht. Which one of these aspects was NOT a direct outcome of this major battle?

Answer: Success of Soviet advance towards Dnieper allowed them to simultaneously launch an offensive in Crimea which was liberated by the end of 1943

The successful conclusion of Battle for the Dnieper did have an impact on situation in Crimea. In the downstream area of the Dnieper in South Ukraine, the Red Army succeeded in blocking and cutting off the land connection of the German 17th Army in Crimean peninsula with the rest of German forces in Ukraine through Perekop Isthmus.

However, the main Soviet offensive to liberate Crimea would take place later, in April-May 1944 Crimean offensive, during which Red Army successfully liberated Crimea and almost completely destroyed German 17th Army and Romanian forces, as they tried to evacuate through the Black Sea to Romania.
10. "The battle of Kursk... the forcing of the Dnieper... and the liberation of Kiev, left Hitlerite Germany facing catastrophe." Which famous Soviet military leader said this?

Answer: Vasily Chuikov

The Hero of Stalingrad battle, after his unyielding stand there, Chuikov was nicknamed "General Stubbornness" by his troops. It was he who devised the tactic of "hugging the Germans"- fighting the enemy at extremely close quarters so that their tanks and aircraft would become ineffective since they wouldn't fire out of fear to hit their own troops. For its heroic performance in the Battle of Stalingrad, Chuikov's 62nd army was granted an elite "Guards" status and renamed to 8th Guards Army. During the Battle for the Dnieper, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army crossed the Dnieper in the lower stream and created bridgeheads on its right bank. Chuikov and his 8th Guards Army victoriously ended the war in Berlin 1945. Thus, they completed an epic journey of over 2770km (1721 miles) from Stalingrad to Berlin.
Source: Author Uspech3da

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