The Combined Bombing Offensive Quiz

Answer: Operation Millennium

The RAF managed to "cobble together" 1047 bomber type aircraft for the mission although only 868 aircraft actually bombed Köln. It is notable that the front line strength of Bomber Command actually stood at 400 (plus/minus) aircraft at the time of "Millennium". Harris mercilessly pillaged the training formations (flying schools and OTU's) for machines and crews to make up the balance, after Coastal Command withdrew permission to "lend" the 250 odd bombers they had committed to the mission.

The RAF lost 43 machines to all causes in the operation, 3.9 percent of the total number committed (56 additional aircraft flew intruder operations against some of the Luftwaffe's Nachtjäger bases).

Answer: Window

Window, an anti-radar device, would not be employed for another year. GEE, a navigation aid, had been used experimentally on a few previous occasions prior to Millennium. The RAF feared that it would be quickly jammed by the Germans and for this reason, held back its wholesale employment for the Millennium operation. Harris' hopes for a firestorm on this occasion were thwarted, in large part due to the layout of the target area. Köln has many large boulevards (which serve as excellent firebreaks) and the city's fire department also rose to the challenge and operated with great bravery throughout and following the raid. Of the 1,455 tons of ordinance delivered on Köln, fully two thirds (970 tons) were incendiaries.

The Luftwaffe's claims for the night of 30/31 May show that Harris' hopes of overwhelming the Luftwaffe fighter control system by use of the "bomber stream" tactic were not a success.

While RAF loss lists attribute only four of the missing machines to nightfighters, the RLM awarded 21 kills to pilots with NJG1 and twelve to NJG2 - a startling disparity in figures!

Answer: "Pink Pansy"

This weapon was employed as a target indicator (TI) and was first used on the night of 10/11 September 1942, during a raid on Düsseldorf. The device was given its name for the pink light that it cast into the night sky as it burned. It was very effective for its intended purpose; the volume (and nature) of the combustibles it contained made it impossible to extinguish.

The introduction of this device was to some degree responsible for the subsequent German efforts at constructing elaborate decoy targets (with the hopes of misleading the RAF pathfinders).

The considerable effort that the Reich devoted to these deception tactics is demonstrative, as it was only one of the many diversions of effort that the bombing campaign imposed upon the economy of Nazi Germany.

Answer: 17 August, 1942.

A few interesting tidbits about the first American heavy bomber mission in the ETO. The main effort to Rouen/Sotteville was "led" by Col. Frank Armstrong on board B-17E #41-2578 "Butcher Shop", the aircraft piloted by Major Paul Tibbets (he of "Enola Gay" fame). Also "along for the ride" was Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, on board B-17E #41-9023 "Yankee Doodle" piloted by Lt. John Dowswell.

The target was the Sotteville marshalling yard and the two aiming points were the locomotive workshops and the Buddicum rolling stock repair shops which were located within this important facility. Bombing was from 23,000 feet; the mission's loadout consisted of three aircraft, each with three RAF 1100lb GP bombs (aiming point: locomotive shops) and nine aircraft each loaded with five RAF 600lb GP (aiming point: Buddicum) for a mission total of 36,900lbs. Given the fact that it was the first mission of these men's military careers, accuracy was well within expectations.

The locomotive facility received one direct hit out of the nine 1100 pounders aimed at it.

The 45 600 pounders fell in a pattern centered 650 yards south of the aiming point, amongst the classification trackage of the yard itself. Given the nature of the target and the fact that roughly 50 percent of the bombs landed within some part of the facility, the mission was deemed an unqualified success. Doubts expressed within the upper echelon of RAF Bomber Command about the projected effectiveness of the USAAF's tactics put significant pressure on these young men to perform; that they were able to provide such a demonstration of prowess on their first effort (and from the US point of view, it was critical that they do so), speaks volumes of the kind of men that made up VIII USAAF Bomber Command.

Answer: 10 June, 1943

Citation: "US Air Force Historical Study 118 (formerly AAFRH-18)2, p. 1

QUOTE: "The campaign began in an atmosphere of skepticism concerning the ability of U.S. heavy bombers to carry out daylight operations at high altitude in the face of powerful enemy fighter defenses, and of indecision concerning the precise nature of the bomber offensive toward which these American forces were supposed to contribute. It was not even clear at that date (August 17, 1942; I've added this for clarity) exactly how strategic bombardment from the United Kingdom should fit into the over-all strategic picture. By June 1943, however, the American bomber force was prepared to take its part in the Combined Bomber Offensive*, an operation possible only after all major doubts and indecisions, both tactical and strategic, had been for practical purposes removed. Toward the attainment of this end, the early operations of the Eighth Air Force contributed a vital, perhaps a determining influence.
*The CBO plan, approved late in May 1943, outlined four phases for the combined operation, the first beginning with April of that year. Some reports on the progress of the CBO follow the plan and consider the offensive to have begun in April. The CBO directive, however, was not issued until 10 June, and it is considered in the present study that all operations prior to that date are preparatory to the CBO proper."

Answer: Operation "Pointblank"

"Pointblank" was given the broad objective of destroying the capability of the Luftwaffe to interfere with the coming invasion of the continent. Although a huge effort was expended against attacks on German aircraft production facilites, results were largely negated by the nature of the targets and dispersal of the factories.

It must be noted that while the attack on the Luftwaffe was an over riding objective, target selection varied according to perceived wartime exigencies. A concerted effort was made against U-Boats, Ballbearings, Synthetic Chemicals, Armaments Production, and a host of other targets as the situation required. Aircraft production facilities were almost always included as "alternate" targets during these missions, whenever practical.

Answer: 15th Air Force

The Fifteenth Air Force was created on 1 November, 1943, headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia. It's formation was largely an administrative reshuffling of forces already in the Mediterranean theater (heavy bomber assets of 9th and 12th AF's), and was initially commanded by General Jimmy Doolittle.

The operational headquarters was moved to Bari, Italy on 1 December, 1943 and later to Foggia, where it would remain for the duration. The German facilities around Wiener Neustadt (in Austria) accounted for an estimated 60 percent of all Luftwaffe fighter production, and these factories were unreachable (with any meaningful bombload) from the 8th AF's bases in England.

The other major objective of the 15th AF was Romania's oilfields in the Ploesti area.

Answer: Himmelbett

The Himmelbett-Verfahren (literally: "heavenly bed method" or "heavenly bed process") was evolved from the initial rudimentary efforts of 1941 into an efficient set of "defensive belts" covering the approaches to the "Grossraum" (Greater Germany). The system of nightfighter control is far too complicated to elaborate on here. The wrong answers are all names of German radar systems!
For anyone interested in this subject, copy and paste this link into your browser once you've finished the quiz: http://www.gyges.dk/Himmelbett.htm
It contains a very comprehensive analysis of the "electronic war" from the German side, supported by primary documentation throughout.

Answer: 27/28 July, 1943; Hamburg

The Hamburg "firestorm" was caused by the combination of a number of factors, the absence of any one of which might well have precluded its occurrence. Many sources cite the abnormally dry climactic conditions as the primary cause yet this is likely the least pertinent of the reasons.

The largest factor was that (for the first time ever, with this number of machines) the RAF was actually able to concentrate their bombing effort - i.e.: they hit their target. The next most crucial was the fact that the city's fire brigades (engaged on mopping up the fires from the night of 24/25 July) could not get the bulk of their equipment into the area of the attack in a timely manner.

This was due to the blast effects of the large number of "cookies" (4000lb HC bombs) in the loadout of the leading elements of this attack, which blocked most of the thoroughfares linking the two areas, with rubble. One must remember that Hamburg had been hit three nights earlier under identical relative humidity conditions, in an area with a similar architectural configuration, by an almost identical force (in terms of both size and weapons loadout) yet did not burn. Why? Because the bombing was dispersed (as usual) and the fire brigades kept the fires separated.

It's recently been proposed that a local atmospheric anomaly, which had moved closer to the area in the intervening three days, (an anti-cyclonic or "high pressure" system) may have been an influence. Given the large number of firestorms that were created in many different atmospheric conditions, this is highly speculative. The ONE salient factor in ALL of the accredited German "firestorms" (there were a total of 16 of them, by my sources) was concentration of the bombing effort. The small city of Pforzheim (pop. 65,000, February 1945), located midway between Stuttgart and Karlsruhe in Baden-Württemberg, was hit on 23 February, 1945 with what was actually the most devastating firestorm of the European war on a per capita basis. Fully 83 percent of the urbanized area was consumed and German records show that 20,277 people were killed, most immolated in the conflagration. As was common by this point in the war, the RAF bombed at a much lower altitude, 8000 feet, which allowed a devastating concentration of bombing. The modern day city which bears the name was built in the shadow of the hill of rubble; all that remains of the original Pforzheim. Due to their magnitude, Hamburg and Dresden are the "big stars" when the topic is discussed. The controversy surrounding this "firestorm" issue stems from the fact that these were not the only two occurrences and as the war wound down (post D-Day), the number of these occurrences increased dramatically. A recent (2006) English translation of a 2002 German work on the subject: "The Fire" by Jörg Friedrich (Translated by Allison Brown: ISBN 0-231-13380-4) contains a damning analysis of what was actually acheived in this period. Written from the perspective of those who lived through this nightmare, it's equal parts an indictment of the National Socialist Government in Germany and Bomber Command's (and the UK's) leadership. Highly recommended!

Answer: Window had disabled the radar predicted flak/searchlights

Window was a nasty surprise for the Reich's defenses. The RAF had deliberately held back on its employment, waiting for just such an opportunity. Almost all the Luftwaffe's ground based anti-aircraft defenses were dependent on radar to some degree. When Window deprived them of their radar, they were blind. Lack of the usual highly concentrated and accurate flak barrage in the target area allowed the bombers a "cakewalk" from their IP to the release point.

There was usually an appreciable "creepback", a tendency to dump your load and get the heck out of the AAA, leading to earlier and earlier bomb releases. With no harrowing gauntlet of accurate flak during the bomb run, the RAF pilots found a little more fortitude on this night.

The crews flying the illumination part of the mission also had a far easier go of it in the target area as a result of this.

Answer: "Wilde Sau" tactics

"Wilde Sau" was a response to the devastating effect of "Window" and was employed against the night time "area bombing" raids of the RAF. This doctrine saw the employment of single engined day fighters operating in the target areas. There is much controversy regarding the usage of captured American heavy bombers in the "shadowing" role, yet the fact remains that it was during this period that after action reports were first received as with regards to suspicion of these activities. Stand-off weapons came in a number of different forms and were a response to the formidable defensive fire put out by a combat box.

These weapons included the WGr21 (21cm) rocket, Bk5 (5 cm) cannon and attempts at bombing the formations with both time fused munitions and parachuted "air-mines" with contact fuses.

The rockets were particularly feared by the American crews. Although they were rather inaccurate, they packed a 40.8 Kg warhead (10.2 Kg bursting charge) and had a blast radius of around 100 feet. Some rather spectacular results (reports of mid air crashes involving two and even three heavies) were achieved on the rare occasions when they did perform as was intended.

The rockets were not considered a success as their (fixed) launching tubes severely degraded the carrier aircraft's performance (particularly when still loaded); when American fighters showed up over Germany, being saddled with this role was a virtual death sentence for Luftwaffe pilots. Head on attacks had first been encountered earlier in the year, over northern France. III/JG2 ace Egon Mayer and his wingman, Georg-Peter Eder had developed the hair-raising tactic (closing speed: 700+ mph). By the summer of 1943 it had evolved into use by Gruppe sized formations, coming in line-astern (one after the next) then circling around for the next pass. This is where "Twelve O'Clock High" got it's name; surely a most unpleasant experience to endure (they were aiming to "incapacitate" the pilots of the bombers with 20mm cannon fire, after all).

Answer: Operation "Tidalwave"

Tidalwave was a full scale mission by the USAAF 9th AF with three Bomb Groups (B-24's) of the 8th AF attached. A total of 177 B-24's were dispatched from Benghazi, Libya on the 2400 mile return trip. Unbeknownst to the planners at IX Bomber Command, the Luftwaffe had strengthened the defenses in the area considerably since the proving mission (Operation Halpro) was flown on 12 June, 1942. To this end, the Germans had installed radar sites in Greece (which gave advance warning of the raid) and hundreds of AAA emplacements, ranging from 20mm up to 128mm in calibre. Bombing was conducted at extremely low level; the results were predictable. 54 aircraft (30.5 percent) failed to return; of those 123 that did, only about 15 percent were deemed as sufficiently serviceable for immediate operations.

These 123 aircraft brought back over 440 wounded aircrew; many of these cases were severe. Lack of the capacity to launch any follow-up mission allowed the Germans to fully employ the pre-sited reconstruction teams and resources and as a result, production at all but one (the Steaua Romana refinery at Campina) of the facilities was back to normal within weeks.

There was actually idle refining capacity available prior to the raid, which also shortened the recovery period by a large degree. This mission and subsequent ones conducted by the 8th AF's B-17 Groups over Germany itself, gave the USAAF a very serious shock at the time.

Answer: The Schweinfurt force flew on, landing in Africa

The force that attacked Regensburg was the group that conducted the "shuttle" portion of this two-pronged assault. Mission 84 was the first use of the concept of shuttle bombing. It was initially conceived as a co-operative effort between the 8th AF and the 9th AF (based in Libya), under the name Operation Juggler. Juggler called for the 9th to attack fighter production facilities in Wiener Neustadt while the 8th hit Regensburg, this hopefully splitting and overwhelming the defenses. Juggler was repeatedly scrubbed due to weather issues (hoping for good weather over England, Germany ... and the Alps - all at the same time?), and the 9th AF flew their portion of the operation on 13 August (in marginal weather).

At this point, the 8th decided to fly the Regensburg attack, adding in the "shuttle" element in hopes of dispersing the German defenders. To this end they reformed all available machines and crews into "provisional" wings and "composite" groups to arrive at two formations of sufficient strength for the operation.

This would be the first large scale deep penetration of German airspace and also, at this point in the war, fighter cover could only operate as far as Eupen, a Belgian town on the German border. Timing was seen as critical for the penetration of the two bomber forces and the weather played havoc with it. On paper, the Regensburg force was to cross the coast under strong escort and draw the Germans south, leaving the way clear for the second wave. The hope was that the Luftwaffe would rearm at bases in the south and continue their pursuit as the first group flew on toward Africa, being drawn out of effective range, thus unable to interfere with the Schweinfurt mission. Unfortunately, the Regensburg force got airborne on schedule while the Schweinfurt force was grounded by fog. As a result, the escorts were recalled early to fly a second mission with the Schweinfurt group which was now getting airborne, two hours behind schedule. By this time the Germans were landing to service their fighters (after savaging the unescorted Regensburg group), and German radar screens revealed the Schweinfurt mission. The decision was taken to leave the smaller Regensburg force to the flak defenses. Even worse, missed rendezvous by both fighter groups meant that the second escort mission found only empty skies, most of the Luftwaffe were still servicing their machines. The Schweinfurt force took the full brunt of the Luftwaffe, including the first large scale use of the WGr 21 by twin engined aircraft, each with four tubes. It was not a pretty sight. The official figure says that 60 aircraft did not return; a closer examination shows that a total of 147 aircraft (39 percent of those dispatched) were "struck off" strength by 8th AF following this mission. A portion of these were left in Africa and were subsequently repaired to fly again with the 12th AF (soon to be 15th AF), however.

Answer: Bremen, Münster, Schweinfurt

Although the evidence was mounting that the unescorted missions were unsustainable, the 8th AF persisted in the belief that if they could just fly one big mission that went as planned, decisive results could be achieved. Poor intelligence was as much to blame for this as was anything else.

As it had been during the "Battle of Britain", the acceptance of wild over claiming (by the bombers' gunners in this case) as fact, led to a serious mis appreciation of remaining German fighter strength. The gunners claimed hundreds of kills per sortie; while the intel folks realized these numbers were high, they didn't realize how out of all proportion to reality they actually were. "Black Week" finally brought the true situation home to General Eaker; 8th AF lost 152 machines and crews on these three missions.

Another 80 aircraft were "struck off strength" as a result of battle damage; not to be overlooked is the psychological damage inflicted upon those crew members who remained nominally "combat capable".

Answer: 16

By this point in the war German nightfighters were making things very unsafe over Germany for the RAF crews. Because hunting the nightfighters was very "challenging" for the RAF, and they had no solution to the Luftwaffe's airborne SN-2 radar, losses were increasingly heavy.

The last three major raids of this period (mid-February- end of March) saw losses rise to wholly unsustainable levels. Of a total of 2626 sorties flown in these three missions, 210 machines failed to return, an aggregate loss rate of 8 percent. On the last mission (Nuremburg, 30/31 March 1944) losses hit 11.9 percent; 95 out of 795 machines dispatched.

A temporary reallocation of Bomber Command to missions against transportation targets in occupied France (as part of the run up to "Overlord") allowed Harris a face-saving escape from this rather embarrassing turn of events without losing his command. Total Bomber Command losses in this period were 1047 aircraft and crews; a further 1700 machines returned to base with levels of damage that varied from total write-off to slight.

In excess of 7000 Commonwealth aircrew were killed or made prisoner during this offensive, more than half of these on the 16 trips to Berlin. Although significant damage was done to the city and in excess of 500,000 of its population were "de-housed", this offensive finally disproved Harris' idea that Bomber Command could "win the war" by demoralizing the population of Germany. The lack of any effort to find a better way to get a return on the massive investment that the UK had made in Bomber Command saw these raids continue with increasing ferocity (still suffering sometimes appalling loss rates) until war's end. Herein lies one of the greatest controversies of the war.

Answer: Operation "Argument"

After a five month hiatus, the USAAF returned in strength to the skies deep over Germany and they did so with a vengeance. This time they brought along their "little friends"; this was the beginning of the end for the Luftwaffe. The P-51B "Mustang" added the vital "deep escort" component to the short range RAF and mid-range P-38/P-47 coverage that they'd always had.

The first major impact to the Luftwaffe was the virtual annihilation of the twin engined, rocket armed, "zerstörer" elements; those which had wreaked such havoc upon the combat boxes during "Black Week" in the Autumn of 1943.

The Germans persisted with the WGr 21, in spite of protests by the pilots who were forced to fly these missions in the face of local American air superiority. Operation Argument cost the USAAF 227 four engined bombers (plus 20 written off upon return) and 28 single seat fighters lost over Germany; it cost the Jagdwaffe nearly 100 pilots killed. Significantly, some of these pilots were the irreplaceable "alte Hasen" (literally: 'old hares'), experienced combat leaders.

Answer: Airfame manufacturing

Pointblank ended on 1 April 1944, when effective control of the bomber forces was transfered to SHAEF (General Eisenhower) in preparation for the Normandy invasion. Although vast tonnage was dedicated to the German aircraft industry, dispersion of the large plants was already well under way and the results were limited.

In light of the huge resources consumed by these missions, the USSBS concluded (post-war) that this effort would have proven much more decisive if it had been directed against either the oil or transportation infrastructure. Ironically, the objective of air superiority was achieved not through destruction of the machines (by targeting the factories) as was planned, but rather by forcing the Jagdwaffe to rise into the increasingly unfriendly skies to attempt to stop the raids.

In hindsight, the Jagdwaffe would have continued to fight (and be whittled away) regardless of what the Americans were bombing. Even prior to dispersion, aircraft factories were very difficult to actually destroy.

The machine tools and jigs had been quickly "blast-proofed" (simple, cheap concrete partitions did the trick) and nothing short of a direct hit within this enclosure would do any damage to these vital elements. As the USSBS proved, losing a dozen or more heavy bombers and crews to destroy three or four dozen completed single engined aircraft on the ground was a total waste of resources. Even if production was interrupted for a week or two, it made no difference at this point in the war; the Jagdwaffe had far more aircraft than they knew what to do with in the Spring of 1944. What they lacked above all was fuel. As a result of this fuel shortage, they lacked a steady flow of trained pilots; specifically, pilots with a level of training that would allow them to survive their first ten (or so) crucial missions. Targeting the fuel industry would have brought this (already critical) situation to a head and may well have been the "straw that broke the camel's back". Germany had never produced as much fuel as she did in the Spring of 1944. Even this was still far too little to meet the operational realities that faced them at this point in the war. Complete destruction of the synthetic industry (which was only just getting up to speed, after more than six years of all out construction and untold billions of Reichsmarks invested) coupled with the loss of the Romanian fields would have changed the historical course of the war. The synthetic plants were highly vulnerable targets; it would have taken less than three months of FULLY DEDICATED tonnage to utterly wreck them, assuming historical weather conditions. Looking back, one can't help but wonder how many millions of lives could have been saved if the maximum effort had been made by the USAAF- AND THE FULL WEIGHT OF BOMBER COMMAND, BY DAY (as opposed to burning civilians alive in their basements) against this one specific group of targets. This is a harsh statement but it reflects an educated opinion on the issue. Tens of thousands of brave young men from the Commonwealth countries and the UK died for the bloodlust of a few depraved maniacs who gave them their orders. As the war progressed, this grew into a total, gross misappropriation of one of the most significant assets of the entire UK war effort. Once the long range escorts made it "safe" to bomb accurately over Germany by day, there was no longer any good reason for the RAF to continue incinerating cities by night. A gross misappropriation indeed, and a crime against the memory of those young men who were forced to give their lives, in the pursuit of such a dubious "strategy".

Answer: The electrical grid

The Allies seriously over-estimated the redundancy designed into the German power grid. All of the major war industries were heavily dependent upon electricity and German capacity was largely central in nature.

Citation: USSBS Summary Report, ETO

QUOTE:"The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production."

Answer: 354 FG

Organized as a unit of the IX Fighter Command, the 354th originally trained on the P-39 Airacobra in anticipation of a tactical role. Upon arrival in Britain, it was decided that this unit would be re-equipped with the P-51B, although they would remain under the administration of IX (Tactical) Fighter Command. Needless to say, the pilots were delighted with this decision.

Although their new mounts were slow to arrive, (the first five of these being taken on charge on 11 November 1943), conversion training proceeded on P-51A's "borrowed" from the tactical recon units of IX F/C.

By the end of November, the 354th had 24 P-51B's on strength and were declared "operational". Their first mission, a fighter sweep over the Pas de Calais, was flown on 1 December with Lt.-Col. Donald Blakeslee in command.

The second mission, flown 5 December, was the Mustang's first as a bomber escort, a short hop to Amiens. On 11 December, 44 Mustangs accompanied 583 bombers to Emden and the first combat loss occurred when Lt. Norman Hall was observed spiraling out of control through the cloud deck.

As VIII Fighter Command were re-equipping their units wholesale with the Mustang, the 354th found themselves returned to their tactical role with IX AF in the wake of the D-Day landings. The 354th finished the war as the highest scoring unit in Northwest Europe in terms of aerial (shoot-down) victories. This info is largely paraphrased from the Osprey title "354th Fighter Group" by William N. Hess.

Answer: Center of gravity issues, due to the rear fuel tank

The oft-discussed 85 gallon rear tank was not added as standard production equipment until the advent of the later block 5 aircraft (the last 550 machines so equipped, were re-designated P-51B-7-NAs) and was not an issue during initial deployment. "Friendly" fire incidents had already been proven a problem with the RAF Mustang I and the A-36 Invader. With the wholesale introduction of the airframe type for aerial combat purposes, this became a very serious issue. In the heat of battle, the early camouflaged Mustangs were so similar to the Bf 109, particularly in profile, that a massive recognition campaign had to be initiated. Although often attributed to other reasons (We didn't feel we had to hide from the Jagdwaffe ...), the subsequent appearance of the unpainted machines was a direct response to this "issue". Problems with the ammunition feed system in the early block aircraft have been well documented and were also solved; first by numerous "field" mods, later with a complete re-design of the armament battery for the D model. The addition of the "blown" "Malcolm Hood" addressed the visibility issues and gave rise to what many consider to be the ultimate P-51, the late model B/C with all the "field" modifications. The rear fuel tank really became a very serious issue with the early (Block 5) D models. The redesign of the rear fuselage to accommodate the "bubble" canopy greatly exacerbated the longitudinal stability problem, previously noted with the late production B/C aircraft. This was addressed with a further reworking of the tail, adding the familiar dorsal fin along the top centerline of the rear fuselage. This modification was subsequently added in the field to some of the earlier B and C models as well.

Thanks for taking my quiz, I hope you found it informative.